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Abstract: This study attempts to analyze the impact of the indirect taxes levy on the plantation sector in 
Indonesia. The aim of this study is to investigate the assumptions that the disincentive fiscal policy could 
generate some trade offs against some other economic variables i.e. National GDP level, Domestic Prices, 
total Exports and Imports, Poverty Rates, Government Revenues and Government Consumption 
Expenditures. This study employs the inter-regional CGE model with bottom-up approach and applying 
the Indonesian Social Accounting Matrix. The empirical results showed that, overall the disincentive fiscal 
policy in the plantation sector could give positive impacts not only to the area of the production forest 
sector, but also to the increasing number of the natural forest area in Indonesia. However, the 
implementation of this policy has some trade offs against some other economic variables. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The implementation of regional autonomy in Indonesia nowadays is a part of the decentralization 
process. Regional autonomy aligned with the enactment of Law No. 32 of 2004 on Local Government and 
Law No. 33 of 2004 on Central and Local Fiscal Balance. In the autonomy era, the local governments are 
expected to be more assured in exploring their financial resources in order to finance both local needs 
and local developments (Machfud, 2005). Nevertheless, the implementation of regional autonomy for 
some government apparatus seemingly defined as the efforts to increase local own revenue through 
provision of local regulations. Some people said that the issuance of local regulations often disregard the 
basic principles and the philosophy of taxes and retribution (BI, 2007). Many tax and retribution 
regulations constituted by the local government were revoked by the central government due to 
contravene with the higher legislation (MOHA, 2011). In the year 2009, approximately 2106 drafts (from 
total 4858 drafts evaluated) of local regulations regarding tax and retributions were called off by the 
central government, since it were pondered as disruption for the local investment development, as well 
as causing high cost economy (DGFB, 2012). Those aforementioned problems already anticipated through 
Law No. 34 of 2000 regarding Local government taxes and retribution, denoted in article 2, paragraph (4) 
that the objects of local tax levied is different from the central tax levied. However, the over power of the 
local government in constituting different taxes and retributions induce bad impact to the communities 
and business endeavour activities. Therefore, to overcome those problems, the central government enact 
Law No. 28 of 2009 in order to enforce a more definite authority for the local governments in terms of 
taxing criterias. One of the subject matters set forth in the Law No. 28/2009 is about the land and building 
tax for rural and urban areas. The law is granting the local government to have full authorization in 
imposing the land and building tax. By transferring such authority to the local government, the central 
government expect that the local own revenue will increase augmentedly (MOF, 2009). In addition to 
those policies, the central government also has another discourse to impose indirect tax on plantation 
which the subject matters currently part of the central government authority. Imposition of indirect tax 
on plantation aims to reduce encroachment of natural forest. It is based on the anxieties that the 
reduction of natural forests area currently is a result of the augmenting expansion of plantation sector as 
appeared in Sumatera, Kalimantan and Papua regions. This study attempts to analyze the impact of the 
indirect taxes levy on the plantation sector. The expansionary levy objects of  indirect tax plantation 
designates expectedly to increase state budget income from the taxation sector. Though, in some extent 
the impact of this policy collide with alteration of the public welfare. Based on the aforementioned 
background, this study was conducted in order to provide different kind scenarios of the indirect tax 
policy impact which (1) imposed by the central government or (2) imposed by the local government.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
CGE models in Indonesia have been developed since the late 1980s. Those models largely pertained in 
CGE Static which employed Input-Output table (table I-O) data source, as well as the Indonesia SAM 
Table. CGE model developed by Lewis (1991) was one of the first CGE model in Indonesia. This model 
utilizing Indonesia Table I-O of 1985. The Model can measure the alteration affects of value added tax 
upon the economic sectors in Indonesia. Another model from Abimanyu (2000), which so-called Indorani 
CGE model had considered some environmental variables such as NO2, CO, SO2, SPM and BOD to examine 
the impact of trade policies on the environment. The financial CGE Model generated by Azis (2000) is a 
model that incorporates financial sectors and real sectors of the Indonesian economy. The real sector 
adopted in this model was a refinement of the Lewis model (1991), while the financial sector was adopted 
from Thorbecke model (1992). The model utilized a specific of SAM financial sector, which aimed to look 
at the impact of the financial crisis upon the income of the household sector.  To the best of our 
knowledge only a limited number of studies in Indonesia has, thus far, related the issue of tax policy 
reforms utilizing CGE model, therefore this study attempts to enrich some of those studies above. In the 
international context, computable general equilibrium models have frequently been applied to measure 
the tax reform impact on the macroeconomic, as argued in the literature review of Piggott and Whalley. 
Piggott and Whalley (2001) build simple quantitative cases of general equilibrium economy, whereas the 
extending VAT component cuts down welfare due to supply side variations towards the home production. 
Consequences from adjustment of the model demonstrate that the extending component of VAT has 
diluted the aggregate efficiency. Boccanfuso, et al (2011) depicted that by contending budget neutrality 
with less taxation level than the one laid in the finance act; re-instituting VAT neutrality by enlarging the 
tax base alters economic intricacy and raises the household welfare considered to the initial condition. 
When they refuses the concept of budget neutrality and reinstates the VAT, they pointed that the sudden 
VAT increment results to a substantial loss in reallocation, particularly for sectors with a faint ex ante tax 
burden. In this condition, household welfare diminishes, as inequalities. McLure (2003) describes 
characteristics of a well designed indirect tax program in the case of Canada. He indicates some contrary 
results coming from inefficient indirect taxation i.e. difference tax regime on taxation of consumers on 
goods and services has adverse impacts for economic neutrality. In addition to that domestic producers 
also bear competitive disadvantage in the absence of destination based taxation principle. Dixon and 
Rimmer (1999) employ a general equilibrium model to examine the affect of Australia’s tax reforms. They 
concluded that the longrun resource share benefits coming from the projected tax varies will be negligible 
i.e. Terms-of-trade result would be negative, as well as composition of exports would alter away from 
services and in favour of goods. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
This study employs a CGE model (Computable General Equilibrium) developed by  Resosudarmo, et al 
(2009) which so-called Inter-Regional of System Analysis for Indonesia-5 Regions (IRSA-INDONESIA 5). 
This model represent inter regional CGE with bottom-up approach and exerting the Indonesian Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) table base calculation. The association amongst inputs and outputs in this 
model is validated through a nested CES-Leontief production function in each production sector. The 
structure of the production function is similar for all sectors. The data structure applied in this model 
divided into five regions i.e. Sumatera region, Java-Bali region, Kalimantan region, Sulawesi region and 
East Indonesia region. Each region fractioned into 35 production sectors i.e. classification of labor (16 
sectors, comprise of: skilled/unskilled labour, formal/informal labour), classification of non-labour 
(accounts for capital and land), classification of house hold (rural and urban households), and other 
institutions such as local governments and corporate enterprise. This model carry out optimization 
calculation at the regional level, while the national result is an aggregation of the regional results. By 
employing SAM basis calculation, the model takes into account inter-regional trade flow, flow of primary 
factors and inter-regional institutional transfer. As for the solver software utilized in this model is 
Generalized Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). Inter regional CGE is an instrument for empiric analysis 
which entails real data sets requirements. This data is conjecturally representing the economy’s general 
equilibrium which is reckoned as the base result, and lots of the parameters of the model are judged on 
the assumption basis. In addition, through categorizing the economic variables as endogenous or 
exogenous, the affect of counterfeit changes in the exogenous variables is broke down in terms of the 
model result. Therefore, the equilibrium model is applied to measure, systematically and in numeric 
terms, the tendency of alteration of certain significant interdependent economic variables. 
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The Model Structure Concept: The IRSA-Indonesia 5 incorporates numerous sets of equations 
(Resosudarmo et al, 2009). Because of limited space, only the fundamental concepts of equation will be 
set forth here. The model of IRSA-Indonesia 5 is utilizing a Linear Expenditure System (LES) model for 
each commodity in the household demand. The LES model derived from the Stone-Geary utility function 
to maximize the budget constraint. The composite of imports and domestic products are consumed by 
household (government and industries) in each region employing a constant elasticity of substitution 
according to Armington function. The composite of domestic products from different regions have a 
constant elasticity of substitution. Meanwhile, the sources of household income are coming from 
production activities of labor and capital in different regions, transfers from other households, transfers 
from national and regional governments and remittances from overseas. All of the consumptions from 
household, government and industries developed the system of demand functions. A top-down income-
distributional system is interconnected with the household demand equations that combine each 
household group in each region into 100 household groups (urban and rural households). The LES 
demand function obtained from the Stone-Geary utility function is utilized to calculate the expenditure for 
each of these 100 households. While, the income of these 100 households is measured by a share 
parameter allotting the income of the original household.  A nested production function is also employed 
in the model for the production side. The Leontief production function is the top level of the production 
function model for each commodity amongst all intermediate products required for production and the 
composite of value added. A constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function is required as the composite 
of value added between capital, labor and land. The CES combination amongst imported and composite 
domestic goods is utilized for each intermediate good in the production of particular commodity. The 
constant elasticity of substitution among different domestic goods from all regions is also estimated. In 
this model, a zero profit condition is counterfeit to portray a fully competitive market. Market clearing 
requires that all markets for commodities and factors of production are in a state of equilibrium; i.e. 
supply matches demand (Resosudarmo et al, 2009). At each level of this nested production function, firms 
maximize their profits for every production functions at each level. Then, firms distribute their products 
domestically and abroad. The amount of goods sent out abroad or preserved for domestic consumption is 
determined by the export demand function and domestic demand system. The inter-temporal part of the 
model comprises mainly of two equations: (1) an equation indicating capital accumulation from one year 
to the another; and (2), the growth of the country’s labour force. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
The simulation model developed in this study is focused on the impact of the indirect tax policy upon the 
plantation sector. The simulation scenario examine the initial conditions before tax policy 
implementation and afterwards the policy enforced. Those scenario is aimed to conceive the impact of tax 
policy upon the Indonesian economy. In this study, the Indonesian economy assumed to be equal to the 
current Indonesian economic condition when the study is made, as well as cateris paribus condition 
assumption is applied. Scenarios originated can be specified as follows: 
 Scenario 1  : The central government impose indirect taxes over the plantation sector by 10 %; 
 Scenario 2 : All of the local governments impose indirect taxes over the plantation sector by 10 
%. 
 
The results of those scenario will be divided into 5 sections, namely: (1) the impact to the land use 
change; (2) the impact on domestic prices; (3) the impact on the total exports and imports; (4) the impact 
on GDP and poverty rates; (5) the impact on government revenues and government consumption 
expenditures. 
 
The Impact to the Land Use: The simulation model showed that (table 1), in general, land use in the 
plantation sector (ESTCR) decreased significantly, especially in Sumatera (R1). In the scenario 1, the 
disincentive fiscal policy contribute to the decreasing number of land use in the plantation sector of 
Sumatera region (R1) by around 378.463 million ha, while in the scenario 2, land use of the plantation 
sector diminish around 371.530 million ha. On the contrary, land use in the production forests sector 
(FORES) in Sumatera region increase by 72.074 million ha, as in the scenario 2, the land use of production 
forest sector only increased by 67.032 million ha. Based on the simulation results, both of those scenarios 
depicted that, the largest increase of natural forest area (C_NFORAREA) is in Sumatera region (R1). In 
Sumatera region, the natural forest area is increased significantly by 306.389 million HA (scenario 1), as 
well as in scenario 2, the natural forest area in Sumatera region also increase by 304.498 million HA. 
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Table 1 : The Impact of Tax Policy on Land Use in Indonesia 
Comodity 
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
 
R1 
(Sumatera) 
    R2 
(Jawa) 
R3 
(Kalimantan) 
R4 
(Sulawesi) 
R5 
(East Indonesia)  
C_LANDAREA 
ESTCR 
1 -378.4637     -50.4351    -133.7818    -121.2965    -121.3798 
2 -371.5304    -160.4621    -115.5221    -120.8169    -102.3586 
FORES 
1 72.0742      -0.3115      40.9689      25.8112      27.0050 
2 67.0323       5.4325      30.9064      24.0018      15.8696 
C_NFORAREA 
Scenario 1 306.3895 50.7466 92.8130 95.4854 94.3748 
Scenario 2 304.4981 155.0296 84.6157 96.8151 86.4890 
(In million hectares/ha) 
 
The Impact on Domestic Prices: The imposition of indirect tax on the plantation sector will distressed 
the producers price level. The low degree of purchasing power in the plantation sector made the 
bargaining power of plantation commodities also depleted. This condition occurs because, when the 
farmers sell their products at the normal price level, they will bear some parts of the levied tax (if they do 
not raise the commodity price).  
 
Table 2: the impact of indirect tax policy on domestic prices 
Comodity 
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
 
R1 
(Sumatera) 
    R2 
(Jawa) 
R3 
(Kalimantan) 
R4 
(Sulawesi) 
R5 
(East Indonesia)  
Domestic Price  
PADDY 
1 -3.9223 -0.6944      -0.1633      -0.3421      -0.5008 
2 -4.1401      -1.2136      -0.1419      -0.3725      -0.5594 
FOREST  
1 -0.5838      -0.4710      -0.4343      -0.5142      -0.4757 
2 -0.6654      -0.6001      -0.4912      -0.6116      -0.5420 
ESTCR 
1 3.4155       3.5393       3.5670       2.4529       4.9908 
2 4.4133       6.3366       4.9875       3.1649       6.2266 
WOODS 
1 -0.0479       0.0045       0.0092      -0.0624      -0.0068 
2 -0.0509      -0.0227      -0.0057      -0.0606      -0.0386 
FOODB 
1 -0.3929      -0.0891      -0.1069      -0.1475      -0.0300 
2 -0.3925      -0.1389      -0.1271      -0.1515      -0.0688 
(In percentage / %) 
 
The largest decreased of consumer domestic price for paddy commodity (PADDY) is occurred in 
Sumatera region by 3.92% (scenario 1), and in the scenario 2, the decreased only reached 4.14%. For 
plantation sector (ESTCR), the largest consumer domestic price decreased is took place in East Indonesia 
(R5) by 4.99% (scenario 1), whereas in the scenario 2, the largest decreased took place in Java (R2) 
region by 6.33%. In the forestry sector (FOREST), the highest consumer domestic price is both took place 
in Sumatera (R1) by 0.58% for scenario 1 and 0.66% for scenario 2. While, in the wood industry sector 
(WOODS) the highest price is occurred in Sulawesi region (R4) by 0.06% (both scenario 1 and 2). 
Obviously, the consumer domestic price of plantation sector (ESTCR) augmented because of the indirect 
tax imposition. 
 
 The Impact on the Total Exports and Imports: Heretofore, the price level of indonesian plantation 
commodity products is still less competitive compare to neighbour countries products. The highly 
efficient of plantation system and productivity in those countries make its price level less expensive 
compare to Indonesian products. The imposition of indirect tax on plantation sector will make its 
commodity price more expensive, which can lead to the declining of the competitiveness of the plantation 
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products. This condition also portrayed by Dixon and Rimmer (1999) that broadening 10% of indirect tax 
would effect negatively to the terms of trade and alter the composition of exports.  
 
Table 3: The Impact on the Total Exports and Imports  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(In percentage / %) 
 
In scenario 1, the largest declines of national export commodity occurred in the plantation sector by 
16.47% (ESTCR), while the largest increases occurred in the export of paddy sector by 3.04% (PADDY). 
On the other hand, the declining of the plantation export commodity is followed with the increasing of the 
plantation (ESTCR) export commodity by 8.98%, while the paddy sector (PADDY) decreases by 3.24%. 
Likewise in scenario 1, in scenario 2, the export level of the plantation sector (ESTCR) also decreased by 
21.25%, which followed with the increasing of the import for plantation sector by 13.47%.  
 
The Impact on GDP and Poverty Rates: The largest share of Indonesian GDP is come from the 
plantation sector. From this view, it can be ascertained that the majority occupation of the Indonesian 
society is farmers. Therefore, some people judge the raising of indirect tax imposition to the farmers 
could lead to iniquity. On the one hand, the imposition would increase the goverment revenue, but on the 
other hand, it would lower the level of the farmers’ welfare which can also bring down the society 
welfare. Emran and Stiglitz (2004) depicted that indirect tax reform base broadening with a revenue-
neutral reduction in trade taxes might diminish welfare.The indirect tax imposition will disrupt the 
economic stability which can increase the level of the poverty rates. This condition can be seen from 
simulation results below.  
 
Table 4: The Impact on GDP and Poverty Rates  
Comodity 
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
 
National 
R1 
(Sumatera) 
R2 
(Jawa) 
R3 
(Kalimantan) 
R4 
(Sulawesi) 
R5 
(East Indonesia) 
GDP 
1 -0.0416 -0.1888 0.0198 -0.0374 -0.2756 0.0888 
2 -0.0563 -0.0485 -0.0631 -0.0088 -0.1011 0.0047 
Poverty 
Incidence  
1 17.3920 18.9498 16.4019 11.5643 19.0655 30.4729 
2 17.4355 18.8235 16.5014 11.5004 18.9496 30.9481 
(In percentage / %) 
 
From the scenario 1, the National GDP level decreased by 0.041%, while in scenario 2, the National GDP 
level decreased deeper by 0.056%. From both scenario 1 and 2, the Sulawesi region (R4) experienced the 
highest GDRP decreases by 0.275% and 0.101%. Nationally in scenario 1 and 2, the poverty incidence 
level increase by 17.4% with the highest increases occurred in the East Indonesia region (R5) by 30.5% 
(scenario 1) and 30.9% (scenario 2). 
 
The Impact on Government Revenues and Government Consumption Expenditures: From the 
scenario 1, national government revenue (Gov’t Revenue) increased by 3.55%, while in the scenario 2, 
government revenue only increased by 0.16%. The decreasing of the total government revenue in 
Comodity scenario Export Import 
PADDY 
1 3.0430 -3.2466 
2 3.1325 -5.3922 
FOREST  
1 2.7821 -0.5969 
2 3.2051 -0.7168 
ESTCR 
1 -16.4735 8.9787 
2 -21.2518 13.4757 
WOODS 
1 0.0500 0.4400 
2 0.1163 0.3313 
FOODB 
1 0.9719 -0.3838 
2 1.0985 -0.5091 
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scenario 2 occurred, because some part of the tax revenue is apportioned to the local government (In the 
scenario 2, the local governments levy their own indirect taxes). The east Indonesia region (R5) 
experienced the largest increasing of government revenue by 3.04%, which is supported, by the 
increasing of domestic prices of the east Indonesia plantation sector 
 
Table 5: The Impact on Government Revenues and Government Consumption Expenditures  
Comodity 
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
 
National 
R1 
(Sumatera) 
R2 
(Jawa) 
R3 
(Kalimantan) 
R4 
(Sulawesi) 
R5 
(East Indonesia) 
Gov’t 
Revenue 
1 3.5477   0.6364 1.0272 1.0020 0.5506 3.0443 
2 0.1559   5.6238 1.4660 3.3553 3.5622 2.0633 
Gov’t 
Consump  
1 3.2351 0.4608       0.7756       0.3875       0.4098       2.3323 
2 -0.4428 4.4095       1.2298       2.3235       2.6731       1.7154 
(In percentage / %) 
 
Likewise the government revenue, in the scenario 1, the government consumption (Gov’t Consump) also 
increased by 3.23%, but when the tax levies authority handed over to the local governments (scenario 2), 
the government consumption decline into 0.44%. This condition is reasonable, since the decreasing of the 
central government revenue will be certainly followed with the decreasing amount of the central 
government consumption.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Overall, the disincentive fiscal policy in the plantation sector could give positive impacts not only to the 
area of the production forest sector, but also to the increasing number of the natural forest area in 
Indonesia. However, this policy has some tradeoffs against some other economic variables. Some of the 
trade offs are: 
A. Trade offs from the 10% indirect taxes imposition conducted by the central government. 
 National GDP level decreased by 0.041%, with the highest GDRP decreases occured in the Sulawesi 
region by 0.275%; 
 The poverty incidence level increase by 17.4% with the highest increases occured in the East 
Indonesia region by 30.5%; 
 However, this policy generate positive impacts for the increasing amount of the central government 
revenue by 3.55%, which also followed with the increasing amount of central government 
consumption by 3.23%. 
B. Trade offs from the 10% indirect taxes imposition conducted by all of the local governments. 
 National GDP level decreased by 0.056%, with the highest GDRP decreases occured in the Sulawesi 
region by 0.101%; 
 The poverty incidence level increase by 17.4% with the highest increases occured in the East 
Indonesia region by 30.9%; 
 There is a significant difference of central government revenue compared to the scenario 2, whereas 
in scenario 2, the central government revenue only increased by 0.156%. This condition assumed to 
be occured because the central government is no longer enjoying the tax revenue from plantation, 
since the tax levies authority is already handed over to the local governments.  
 
Those above trade offs are normally encountered as implications of conducting one policy. In our view, 
sound policy involves a mix of good analytic thinking and pragmatism. Therefore, a substantially cost and 
benefit analysis is needed to provide the best policy in terms of finding out whether the impact of one 
policy can generate and optimizing the welfare of the society. Empirical experts can't do their works 
unless they base their work in applicable theoretical principles that are distinctly stated and subject to 
scrutiny. In addition to that, recognizing factors that leave quantification with at least some viewpoint to 
their qualitative emphasis. A sound strategy is to estimate tangibles cautiously, considering 
administrative/program costs.  Simplistic models cannot be employed to produce accurate, well-
grounded standards of the costs and benefits of programs and policies. For the highest extent potential, 
policy maker should distinguish intangible changes in economy and anticipate their potential implications 
for efficient and effective policy design. 
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